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CHANGING STATE CoNsTITUTIONS: DUAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE AMENDING PROCESS

PeterJ. Galie*and ChristopherBopst**

Providing formal, orderly and deliberate change in a constitutional
regime - "Responding to Imperfection:' - is one of America's major
contributions to the theory and practice of constitutional government, a
contribution which has come from the state as well as the national
constitutional tradition. Unfortunately, the focus of scholarship has
centered on the national constitution and national amendment at the
expense of the rich amendment tradition at the state level. This neglect
has impoverished our thinking about, and narrowed our horizons
concerning constitutional reform. An examination of the modes of
constitutional revision at the state level reveals a remarkably diverse and
active reform tradition.
The consequences of this neglect can be illustrated by examining the
question of how easy or difficult it should be to amend a constitution.
Madison, in the Federalist Papers posed the dilemma clearly:
"guard[ing] equally against that extreme facility, which would render the
Constitution too mutable; and the extreme difficulty, which might
perpetuate its discovered faults".' Beyond the belief that it should be
more difficult than the process by which ordinary legislation is adopted,
there is little agreement in theory or practice.
What are the hazards of making it too difficult? A constitution
* Peter J. Galie, Ph.D., University of Pittsburgh, is Professor of Political Science at Canisius
College in Buffalo, New York. He is the author of numerous articles on aspects of state
constitutional law and two books: THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE
(1991) and ORDERED LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK (1996).
** Christopher Bopst, B.A. Political Science, Canisius College, is a first year student at Notre
Dame Law School.
I. Sanford Levinson ed., RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT (1995).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, Isaac Krammick ed., The Federalist Papers, 284 (1987).
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becomes irrelevant when needed change and rectification of mistakes
becomes all but impossible; procedures will be devised to subvert or
circumvent obsolete or constrictive constitutional provisions; and the
judiciary will likely take on a hypertropic role. The prime example is the
national Constitution. The difficulty of amending that Constitution has
led to a regime dominated by Non-Article V constitutional change. The
constitutional revolution effected by the Reconstruction Period was
successful only by skirting the formal requirements of Article V3 ; and
the constitutional transformation which legitimized the modem welfare
state was engineered by the use of "transformative judicial appointments"
and "transformative opinions",' opinions which are the functional
equivalent of amendments. With good reason the Supreme Court has
been called a continuing constitutional convention.5 One consequence
of reliance on Non-Article V change is that the text becomes less and
less relevant and informative about the way government operates, as most
change takes place "off-text". 6 These changes, particularly when
fashioned by the judiciary, have created a "formulaic constitution".7 The
standard invidious contrast between the elegant parsimony of the national
document and the dense, complex, indecipherable nature of state
constitutions is misleading. The five hundred plus volumes of the United
States Reports, the records of our continuing constitutional convention,
reveal this formulaic constitution. The style is an amalgam of the
academic and bureaucratic - "complex, layered and equivocal" - detailed
and dense enough to compete with the constitutional language of the
Amending the national Constitution has become all but
states.'
impossible, although some believe it unnecessary, as the Supreme Court
and Congress accommodate the necessity of interpreting the constitutional text to adapt to the considered requirements of the times, and respond
to the demands of persistent majorities.9 The equal rights amendment,

3. Bruce Ackerman, HigherLmvmaking, in Levinson, supra note I, at 77-79.
4. Id. at 81-82.
5. Woodrow Wilson quoted in, Harold W. Chase and Craig R. Ducat, EDWARD S.CORWIN'S

THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY, 5 (1974).
6. Stephen M. Griffith, Constitutionalismin the United States: From Theory to Politics,in
Levinson, supra note 1, at 56.
7. Robert Nagel, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES, 121, (1989).
8. Id. at 128.
9. Some would add, and unnecessary, as the Court and the Congress have accommodated the

need to adapt the Constitution to the felt needs of the time and in response to the demands of
persistent majorities. Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
NationalPolicy-Maker,VI, JournalofPublicLaw, 279, (Fall, 1957). After comparison with amendment rates in the fifty states and selected foreign countries, Donald Lutz concluded that the U.S.
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flag protection amendment, electoral college reform amendment, and the
balanced budget amendment, among others, all fell victim to the obstacle
course that is Article V. If constitutional amendments can no longer be
adopted under any but extreme circumstances, the country has come to
the end of constitutionalism as a distinctive and meaningful idea "in the
sense that Americans have lost the confidence, present in the late
eighteenth century, that they have the ability rationally to diagnose
fundamental problems of their political order, discuss those problems
openly, and resolve them through a special political process that results
in changes to the text of the Constitution". 10
If such is the fate of the great experiment with constitutionalizing
fundamental change at the national level, that fate is not shared at the
state level. The tradition of state constitutionalism, though submerged
by our fixation on the national Constitution perceived as a symbol of our
success as a nation, is not only flourishing, but, in the variety of
available procedures for constitutional reform, is "truly astonishing"."
State modes of constitutional reform are usually pointed to as an
example of the second hazard, i.e., making it too easy to effect constitutional change. This charge has been a persistent one. "It takes no more
effort [in Oregon] nor any greater care to amend a clause of the
constitution than it does to enact, alter, or repeal a statute". 2 Some
commentators go so far as to conclude: "since all law is reduced to one
level ... we no longer have any constitutional law". 3 Paradoxically,
much of this literature simultaneously laments the fact that it is so
difficult to achieve constitutional reform. 4
The important lessons provided by state constitutional practice
concerning contemporary issues related to the amendment process do not

Constitution is "unusually and probably excessively difficult to amend." Donald Lutz, Towards a
Theory of ConstitutionalAmendment, in Levinson supra note 1, at 265.
10. Griffith, supra note 6, at 60-61.
11. W. Brooke Graves, State ConstitutionalLaw: A Twenty Five Year Summary, WILLIAM &
MARY L. REV. VIII (Fall, 1966) p. 6.
12. State v. Schluer, 59 Ore. 18, 25 (1811).
13. Margartet C. Klinglesmith, Amending the Constitution of the UnitedStates, 73, UNIV. OF
PENN. L. REV., 355, 371. David Fellman, Mhat Should a Constitution Contain, in W. BROOKE
GRAVES, ED., MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, 139-150, (1960).
14. Ernest R. Bartley refers to the drafting of constitutional material in a form acceptable to
the people as a task that frequently approaches the "impossible", Methods of ConstitutionalChange
in Graves, supra note 11, at 36. See also TIP H. ALLEN & COLEMAN RANSOME JR., CONSTITUTUTIONAL REVISION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 16-20, (1962); ELMER E. CORNWELL JR., JAY S.
GOODMAN AND WAYNE R. SWANSON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE POLITICS OF REVISION,
x-xii., (1974).
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exhaust the value of the state constitutional tradition.
Questions concerning constitutional reform debated at the theoretical
level in academic journals have been played out in the constitutional
arenas of the states with instructive results. For example, recent
scholarly attention has focused on the issue of whether amendments
which materially change the pre-existing structure of government or
offend human dignity would be unconstitutional. Is the power of
amendment limited? This argument has been recently advanced, inter
alia, by Walter Murphy."5 In the former category would be an amendment to abolish constitutional democracy; in the latter an amendment to
permit slavery. Murphy and others claim that the amendment process
6
could not be employed constitutionally to allow either.'
Some state constitutions make a distinction between constitutional
revision and constitutional amendment. When California adopted an
amendment, through the referendum process, that would have required
judges, when interpreting state constitutions, to follow the Supreme Court
interpretation of comparably worded clauses in the national constitution,
the California Supreme Court in Raven v. Deukemejian held that such an
amendment effected so fundamental a transformation of the constitution
as to constitute a revision rather than an amendment. 7 Since the
California Constitution permitted revision only by special convention or
legislative amendment, the constitutional initiative was invalid. Nevada
permits revision as opposed to amendment only by conventions.'
Typically, state amending clauses speak of amending when referring to
legislative or popular initiation, and revision only when referring to
conventions, implying that large scale or systematic changes in the
document are to be undertaken only by convention. Though there is no
bright line between amending and revising, and some states have
combined commission recomendations with legislative amendments to
accomplish what would qualify as systematic reform, the distinction does
exist and continues to play a role in protecting fundamental law from
being undermined by radical change in the guise of an amendment.
Another issue of recent scholarly debate concerns the question of

15. Walter Murphy, Merlin'sMemory: The Past and FutureImperfect of the One and Future
Polity, in Levinson, supra note 1, at 163. The argument is not entirely new. For earlier versions
see Lester Orfield, Amending the FederalConstitution, 87-88, (1942).
16. Murphy supra note 15, at 173-175. See also William F. Harris, 11, The Interpretable
Constitution, Chap. 4, (1993).
17. 801 P. 2d 1077 (Cal., 1990).
18. Nevada Const., Art. 16. see. 2.
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whether Article V is the exclusive method by which formal constitutional
revision or amendment can be effected. Scholars such as Akhil Reed
Amar have argued that the article should not be interpreted as saying that
it provides the only means to amend the document. Further, "Article V
nowhere prevents the people themselves, acting apart from ordinary
government, from exercising their legal right to alter or abolish
government, via the proper legal procedures".' 9 For Amar a national
referendum which obtained majority support would be sufficient to ratify
amendments. Whether such majoritarian revision is permitted or
consistent with the Federalist constitutional theory undergirding the
national Constitution is problematic, but it is certainly not alien to the
process of constitutional change at the state level where majoritarianism
has played a more prominent role.20 New York procedure is typical in
that it requires a majority vote of two successive legislatures followed by
a majority of those voting on the proposition at a general election.2'
More impressive is the evidence on the issue of the exclusivity of the
amending process specified in the various state constitutions. The
constitutional convention is a method common to all fifty states, although
in a handful of them the constitutions are silent on the right to hold a
convention. Courts in those states have generally held there to be a right
to hold such a convention even though none is specified in the document,
on the theory that a right to hold a constitutional convention is an
inherent right of the people to alter their own form of government.22
Dual Constitutionalism
With respect to the methods of amending the national and state
constitutions, the differences are so great that it is fair to speak of a dual
constitutionalism in America.23 The extent to which states permit, nay
require, citizen participation and the extent to which this participation is
majoritarian in character are the most striking differences between the
national and state constitutional traditions. Direct citizen participation in
the national amending process is restricted to one act, the electing of

19. Akhil Reed Amar, PopularSovereignty and ConstitutionalAmendment, in Levinson supra

note 1, at 90.
20. For a view contrary to Amar's see David R. Dow, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in
Levinson, supra note 1,at 117; and John Vile, Legally Amending the United States Constitution:The
Exclusivity ofArticle V's Mechanics, CUMBERLAND L. REv. 21 (1991), 271-307.
21. N.Y. Const., Article XIX. Eighteen other states have similar majoritarian procedures.
22. Tip Allen & Coleman Ransome Jr., supranote 14, at 4.
23. Judith Kaye, Dual Constitutionalismin Practiceand Principle42 Rec. A.B. City N.Y. 3
(1987), reprinted in 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 399 (1987).
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convention delegates, should such a convention be authorized. 24 Four
methods of constitutional change are employed by the states: legislatively initiated amendment, constitutional convention, constitutional
commission, and popular initiative. Within each category there are
numerous variations.2 5 While the amending process of Article V has
fallen into disuse, largely superseded by non-Article V, "constitutional
change", formal constitutional revision at the state level has shown a
remarkable vitality (CHART 1).
This has no doubt contributed to the legislative character of state
constitutional politics and the lengthy policy oriented character of their
respective documents.
Congress has successfully deflected most
proposals for amending the national Constitution. Of the approximately
ten thousand proposals submitted to the' Congress since 1789, only
twenty seven have been successfully ratified, making the chances little
better than one in six thousand. Whereas states have preferred to turn
ordinary legislation into constitutional amendments, the Congress has
preferred to turn potential constitutional amendments into legislation.26
I. THE LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE
Legislative initiative is the most commonly used and most
successful means of constitutional change in the states. Of the 5,000
plus amendments adopted by the states as of 1993, over 90% were
adopted by legislative initiative.27 With the single exception of
Delaware, where approval of two-thirds vote of two successive legislatures is sufficient to amend the constitution, all states require popular

24. Proposals to amend the Constitution providing for more direct participation in the
amendment process have been repeatedly made thoughout this country's history. See Orfield, supra
note 15, at 92.
25. Complete information on these these variations can be found in ALBERT STURM, THIRTY
YEARS OF STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING, 1938-1968, pp. 118-155, (1970). For over fifty years,

the late Albert Sturm has compiled the record of constitutional revision in the states in his annual
summaries of state constitutional change in the Book of the States. Since the late 1980s that task
has been taken up by Janice May. These compilations are convenient, reliable sources of state
constitutional activity for which all students of state constitutional law are indebted.
26.

CLEMENT VOSE, CONSTITUTUTIONAL CHANGE: AMENDMENT POLITICS AND SUPREME

COURT LITIGATION SINCE 1900, 341-42, (1972). Vose gives as examples the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, the Wagner Act and the Civil Rights Act. A more recent addition would be the Americans with
Disabilities Act 42 U.S. C. 12101 et. seq. (1990).
27. Figures adapted and updated from Sturm, supra note 25, at 29-31. If we exclude newly
revised constitutions submitted to the voters by conventions, and include only the separate amendments, convention submissions have a slightly higher success rate, 68% versus 65% for legislative

submissions.
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ratification for each amendment proposed by the legislature. Beyond
these common features state charters contain a variety of procedural
requirements for initiation and ratification.28
TABLE I
Frequency of Passage Required
Ordinary

Once Twice
9
11

Majority Required
Extraordinary

29

4

Taken from Gerald Benjamin & Melissa Cusa, "Amending the New York State Constitution Through
The Legislature", in Temporary State Commission on Constitutional Revision, New York Constiltuion: A BriefingBook, ed., Gerald Benjamin (Albany, New York 1994) pg. 67. Connecticut, Hawaii,
and New Jersey are included twice as they each have two different methods of constitutional

amendment.

Legislative initiative is ordinarily employed for limited change in the
constitution and, in fact, some states prohibit more extensive revision by
amendment. When the Florida legislature used a device known as a
"Daisy-Chain", interlocking major constitutional revision such that if one
amendment failed, all would fail, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated
the proposal.2 9 Wishing to avoid the problems usually associated with
constitutional change by legislative action - a lengthy, confusing,
chaotic document - the Florida legislature in 1964 offered an amendment allowing revision without a constitutional convention. That
amendment was accepted by the voters. The Supreme Court in Alabama
invalidated an attempt by the Alabama legislature to submit a new
constitution to the voters on the grounds that the constitution provides for
a convention." Systematic revision by amendment is also prohibited
in Delaware. Other states have employed the legislative amendment to
present the electorate with revised constitutions. Georgia did so
successfully in 1945 as did North Carolina in 1971.
The legislative method is the least controversial form of constitutional change. The fact that these amendments must have approval at
least once, and/or extraordinary majorities of both houses, as well as
approval by the people, indicates the amendment is likely to have the
support of significant political forces in the state. Requiring more

28. Sturm, supra note 25, at 118 - 127, provides fuller descriptions of these variations.
29.
30.

Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1958).
State v. Manley, 441 So.2d 864 (Ala. 1983).
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elaborate procedures for passage, as well as ratification by the voters,
minimizes the possibility that radical constitutional measures will
succeed.
In recent years the charge has been made that amendments to state
bills of rights have reduced rights and threatened others. Of the
legislative amendments adopted between 1970 and 1986, 40 were rights
restrictive and 36 rights enchancing. 3 From 1986 to 1990 a similar
pattern emerged with 20 restrictive and 19 expansive measures adopted.
However, eight of the 20 rights reducing measures were passed by
popular initiative rather than by legislative proposal. Subtracting those
eight, the record stands at 12 restrictive and 19 expansive measures. Of
the 40 restrictive measures 30 involved criminal justice. This diminution
of rights is reason for concern, but it should be viewed in light of nationwide developments. These state amendments are consistent with the
decisions of the Supreme Court, congressional legislation, and the
pronouncements of the President concerning the criminal justice
system. On the positive side, seventeen "Little ERA's", the right of
privacy, rights of the disabled, and environmental protections, to name
a few, have been added by legislative amendment during the period
under study.
Although valuable and desirable constitutional change has been
accomplished by legislative initiative, it is not an adequate substitute for
general and systematic constitutional revision. Legislative inertia,
irreconcilable political divisions ("gridlock"), legislative self interest, and
domination of the legislative assembly by pressure groups, are the other
weaknesses associated with legislative initiative.
II.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS

Subsequent to the establishment of the federal union, this country
has never held a national constitutional convention; the states have held
233. Twenty-six of these were convened between 1960 and 1995, with
the greatest concentration occurring in the 1960s when thirteen conventions were held. Between 1960 and 1974, thirty-two of the fifty states
made some efforts to address the adequacy and effectiveness of their
constitutions. Since 1960 four states have adopted a requirement that a

31. Janice May, ConstitutionalAmendment and Revision Revisited, Publius: The Journalof
Federalism 17, 174-175, (Winter, 1987). May reports 44 rights-restrictive measures but four of those
passed by constitutional initiative dealt with infra pp.47ff.
32. May, supra note 31, at 178.
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call for a constitutional convention be submitted periodically to the
voters, bringing the total number so doing to fourteen.33
The constitutional convention continues to be the most efficacious
method of conducting systematic constitutional reform. A convention is
the most appropriate vehicle for reform, when: (1) a constitution has
accumulated massive detail, obsolete provisions and inconsistent
alterations have appeared; (2) social and economic transformations
requiring significant constitutional modernization have transpired; (3) the
legislature is indifferent or actively opposed to any constitutional change,
especially relevant when the change involves reapportionment, term
limits, unicameralism, the initiative and referendum and fiscal reform;
and (4) issues are too complex to be dealt with by voters through
amendment.
The issue of fiscal reform in New York is a case in point. Court
decisions eviscerating sections of the debt and spending limitations in the
state's constitution and the evasive tactics of the governor and legislature have created strong pressures for constitutional reform.3 4 Should
such reform be accomplished by legislative amendment or constitutional
convention? The state legislature has proposed constitutional amendments addressing these issues which were rejected by the voters in 1995.
Is the issue so complicated and fundamental as to require the full
consideration of a convention? Has the legislature effectively confronted
the problem? Or has it refused to submit the needed changes because
they might jeopardize legislative prerogatives or those of the parties?
Are there additional issues of sufficient importance needing attention?
Former Governor Mario Cuomo's Temporary State Commission on
Constitutional Revision suggested a series of "Action Panels" to propose
constitutional reform in four areas. If these proposals are acted upon, the
needed reform will have been achieved. If no action is taken, a majority
of the Commission's members recommended a "yes" vote in 1997 when
the question of calling a convention will be on the ballot. 35 The
recommendation, it was hoped, would place the onus on politicians to
address needed constitutional reform, with the constitutional convention
functioning as a method of last resort.
The major objections to conventions are that they are cumbersome,

33. The four are: Connecticut, Illinois, Montana and Rhode Island. The span of years runs
from nine (Hawaii) to twenty in New York, Maryland, Missisippi, Montana, Ohio, and Oklahoma.
34. On this issue see Robert Kerker, State Government Finance,in GERALD BENJAMIN ED.,
THE NEW YORK CONSTITUTION A BRIEFrNG BOOK, 157-175, (1994).
35. EFFEcrvE GOvERNMENT NOW FOR THE NEW CENTURY, 6-8, (1995).
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expensive instruments which, even when successful in recommending
meritorious proposals are, likely as not, to have their work rejected; and
the possibility of a "runaway convention", the specter of "Pandora's
Box".
A convention's success or failure depends on a number of
variables, only some of which are under the control of proponents.
Thorough preliminary preparation is necessary, and support from the
press and prominent state and public figures must be obtained.
Opposition from interests which may be threatened by a convention must
be neutralized.
During the convention, moderate partisanship or bipartisanship has
led to success more frequently than highly partisan conventions.36
Careful consideration must be given as to how the revisions are to be
submitted to the voters. A major decision confronting each convention
concerns presentation. Should reforms be submitted as a package, on an
all or nothing basis, or should voters be permitted to vote separately on
the proposed reforms? Of the three unlimited conventions held in New
York in the 20th century, two, held in 1915 and 1967, presented new
constitutions to the voters for a yes or no vote. Those two were
resoundly defeated. The third, convened in 1938, submitted its reforms
separately and the voters approved nine of the twelve propositions.
Mobilization of supporters for a ratification campaign should not
oversell the document nor raise suspicions beyond those inevitably
accompanying constitutional change. The pitfalls are numerous and
formidable: partisan division, opposition from threatened interest groups
and conflict among supporters. Constitutional reform is an arduous
struggle because it rarely engages voter attention, is greeted by a
suspicious electorate which, when confronted with complex ballot issues,
has tended to vote in the negative."
The other danger associated with the calling of a convention is the
Pandora's Box problem. The specter was raised recently when the
question of calling a national convention was perceived by some as an
invitation to provide a forum for "reactionary populism", i.e., an angry
electorate in a resentful mood, inclined to insert into the constitution
provisions for a balanced budget, the death penalty, abortion, a prohibition against flag burning and the like. Former Associate Justice William
J. Brennan declared the prospect for a convention "The most awful thing

36. Sturm, supra note 25, at 62; Cornwell, supra nota 14, at 59-60.
37. Sturm, supra note 25, at xi.
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in the world". 8 This statement reflects a distrust of the peoples'
judgments in the context of contemporary movements to amend or revise
our constitutions. On the question of calling a national convention, we
39
have moved from "Gay Abandon" to "Cautious Resistance".
Unlike the national government, states have extensive convention
experience. Moreover, the governmental functions of state constitutions,
and their symbolic import in the polity differ substantially from that of
the national document, making at least some of the arguments raised
against a national convention inapposite at the state level. Nevertheless,
opponents of state conventions worry that such conventions might adopt
extreme measures on the issues they were called to address, or address
issues unrelated to those that gave rise to the convention, or both. What
has been the record of state constitutional conventions held in this
country?
Ironically, the greatest charge leveled at constitutional
conventions is not their inclination to experiment with change to propose
extreme ideas or structures, but their conservatism. An examination of
the proposals originating from these conventions provide little or no
support for the view that state constitutional conventions constitute a
danger to the values that comprise the American constitutional tradition.
Most conventions held in the 20th century are more vulnerable to the
criticism that they have been too cautious and unwilling to offer
innovations. 40 A study of the record of the nine conventions held in
New York reveals that they have remained near the center of the political
spectrum, sometimes moving in the direction of pragmatic liberalism,
other times towards a moderate conservatism. In New York, constitutional change has occurred incrementally, creating a tradition of
continuity, and resulting in a heavily detailed, policy oriented document.4" Even when theoretically unlimited, conventions are in fact
limited by the constitutional tradition they inherit, the resistance of major
parties to further political experimentation in the forms and techniques
38. As quoted in Russell L. Kaplan, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP, Vii., (1982).; see also
Gerald Gunther's reaction in ConstitutionalBrinksmanship: Stumbling Towards a Convention, 65
A. B. A. Journal, 1046, (1979).
39. Linda Healy, Past and Present Convention Calls: From Gay Abandon to Cautious
Optimism, paper presented at the Southwestern Political Science Association Meeting, Savannah Ga.,
November 1, 1984.
40. Ralph Earle Baker, Constitutional Revision in Five States: Limited Versus Unlimited
Conventions, (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois (1970) (Urbana-Champaign). See
also Paul J.Weber and Barbara A. Perry, UNFOUNDED FEARS: MYTHS AND REALITIES OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 80-88, (1989).

41. Peter Galie, A Pandora'sBox: Holding a ConstitutuiionalConvention in New York, in
EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT Now FOR NEW YORK, supra note 35, at 80-81.
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of government, and the particular configuration of interest groups
pursuing their various objectives. "The empirical evidence . . . makes it
clear that any convention functions within very effective practical
limitations".4 2
Legal guarantees that a convention will not adopt extreme or
divisive measures are not possible, but the record of past conventions, the
states' constitutional traditions and the inevitable necessity for compromise, make the specter of Pandora's Box a theoretical possibility rather
than a real probability.
One device for confronting the related problems of a runaway
convention and the relatively high failure rate of unlimited conventions
is the limited convention. Such a convention has the advantage that
narrowly selected constitutional changes have a better chance of
acceptance by the voters than do broader and more sweeping changes
from an unlimited convention. Moreover, when voters select delegates,
they will know with some certainty what the issues will be before the
convention. The data support these putative advantages. Of the twentythree unlimited conventions held between 1938 and 1968, twelve were
approved and eleven were defeated. Of the nine limited conventions held
during that period, the work of eight was approved.43
Although there is some controversy regarding the constitutionality
of limiting a convention, the generally accepted state rule is that the
citizens (but not necessarily the legislature) may limit a convention's
agenda by approving the limitations in a popular vote." There is no
guarantee that a limited convention would abide by any limitations, as
the 1787 Convention demonstrates. However, the state record suggests
that danger is minimal. Of the 233 conventions held in America, only
six overrode limitations placed on them. Since 1908, however, there is
not a single example of a limited convention stepping outside its
charge." Not all states have this method as part of their constitutional
order or political culture. For example, the wording of the New York
Constitution can be read as denying the legislature the power to call a
limited convention.46 Regardless, it has not become a part of the state

42.

VERNON

O'ROURKE

AND

DOUGLASS

CAMPBELL,

CONSTITUTION-MAKING

IN A

DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND PRACTICE INNEW YORK STATE, 26, (1943).
43. Sturm, supra note 25, at 65-66.
44. Francis H. Heller, LimitingA ConstitutionalConvention: The StatePrecedents,3 CARDOzO
L. REv. 575 (1982).
45. Weber & Perry, supra note 40, at 97.
46. N.Y. Const., Art. XIX; John Bebout, Recent Constitution Writing, 25 TExAS L. REv. 1074

(1957).
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constitutional culture despite the 1802 Convention called by the
legislature for very limited purposes. Most likely, the 1802 precedent did
not take root because it was called by the legislature at a time when no
constitutional provisions existed for any amendment procedure. Of
course a limited convention enables the state legislature to exercise
considerable control over the character of a convention while assuming
no responsibility for proposing amendments.
Although the record of state constitutional conventions is mixed, the
proposed revisions which have been approved are fairly characterized as
moderately progressive and have generally been applauded as valuable
improvements over the status quo.
IlI.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION

The constitutional commission, unlike the convention and legislation
initiative, is a method for achieving constitutional reform that is
unprecedented at the national level. Thirty six states have made use of
this procedure in the past thirty years.47 Commissions have performed
a number of tasks: studying constitutions, recommending changes, and
preparing for constitutional conventions. Fifty-one of the sixty-two
commissions functioning from 1964 to 1993 were primarily study
commissions. Those of Idaho, Illinois, Ohio and Mississippi were also
given some preparatory functions. The Florida commissions were
granted authority to recommend constitutional change directly to the
voters without the approval of a convention or the legislature.
Although some form of constitutional commission has been in
existence since 1852, such bodies were not recognized in the constitution
of any state until the 1968 Florida Constitution. This document created
a thirty-seven member Constitution Revision Commission appointed by
the leaders of the three branches of the government and mandated to
convene in 1978 and every twentieth year thereafter. In 1988 Floridians
approved a constitutional amendment creating a Tax and Budget Reform
Commission, a twenty-five member body with jurisdiction limited to tax
and budget matters. All other commissions have been created by statute,
executive order, or legislative resolution. Of the sixty-two commissions
operating during the last thirty years, thirty-five were statutory.

47. Data collected on commissions was assembled from ALBERT STURM, THIRTY YEARS OF
STATE CONSTIUTrION MAKING, 1938-1968 supranote 25, at 36, and his biennial summaries of state
constitutional revisions in the Book of the States, published by the Council of State Governnments.
Janice May assumed the task of compiling the data in the 1990-91 publication.
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Legislative resolutions were responsible for the establishment of sixteen
commissions; ten were formed by executive order; and one, the North
Carolina Constitution Study Commission was created without an official
mandate, by a joint steering committee of the North Carolina State Bar
and the North Carolina Bar Association.
Membership on these commissions is appointed or ex officio, with
appointment predominating. Although governors are the primary
appointing authorities, leaders in the legislature and chief justices of the
states high courts play a role. The smallest commission, established by
Alaska, consisted of two members, while the largest, established in 1985,
was Mississippi's 350 member Constitutional Study Commission.
Table II shows the number of constitutional conventions and
commissions functioning from 1952 through 1993, subdivided by
creation date and classified by type.
TABLE II

USE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 1952-1993
(BY CREATION DATE)

PERIOD

1952-1957
1958-1963
1964-1969
1970-1975
1976-1981
1982-1987
1988-1993
TOTALS
*FOUR

CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS
UNLIMITED LIMITED TOTAL

CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS
STUDY PREPARATORY TOTAL

2
1
9
3
2
2
0

3
2
3
4
1
0
1

5
3
12
7
3
2
1

6
20
26*
6
7
3
4

2
2
6
1
1
1
1

8
22
32
7
8
4
5

19

14

33

72

14

86

OF THESE COMMISSIONS HAD STUDY AND PREPARATORY DATES.

Resort to the use of conventions and commissions has increased
steadily since the mid century, accelerating in the 1960's and reaching
a peak in 1969, with the creation of nine commissions. Since then there
has been a sharp decline in the resort to conventions, and a smaller
decline in commissions. From 1976 to 1993 seventeen commissions

HOESTRA LAW & POLICY SYMPOSIUM

[Vol, 1:27

were created, as compared to six conventions. In the 1960's forty states
attempted to revise their constitutions through avenues other than
legislatively proposed amendments; in the following two decades sixteen
states made such attempts. The commissions operating during this
period, though fewer in number, were granted increased authority.
The range of authorizations for preparatory commissions varies
widely. Some, such as the 1969 Illinois Constitutional Study Commission, and the 1968 Arkansas Constitutional Revision Study Commission,
were authorized to examine their constitutions and to submit appropriate
recommendations. The Montana Convention Commission of 1971 was
directed to provide factual information to the convention but no
recommendations. Other commissions, such as the 1965 Connecticut
Commission to Prepare for the Constitutional Convention and the
Pennsylvania Convention Preparatory Committee of 1967, were
instructed to do no more than prepare the physical facilities, develop a
budget, and establish convention rules.
A preparatory commission, when properly funded and given
adequate time, can be an indispensable tool for a constitutional convention. New York established preparatory commissions for its last four
conventions, with mixed results. In 1938, following legislative rejection
of Governor Herbert Lehman's request for a preparatory commission in
anticipation of the 1938 Convention, Lehman appointed a committee to
provide delegates with information on critical issues. The committee
produced twelve volumes, known as the Poletti Reports after its chair,
Charles Poletti. These reports have remained to this day a comprehensive and reliable source of information on the New York Constitution.4 8
In contrast to the quality of the Poletti Reports were the sixteen reports
submitted by the New York Temporary State Commission on the
Constitutional Convention, appointed in anticipation of the upcoming
1967 convention. The information was sparse, and submitted too late to
be of much value to the delegates.4 9
Delegates to conventions are often ill equipped to address the broad
spectrum of issues confronting them and much of what they will be
expected to evaluate differs from the statutory matters to which
politically oriented delegates are accustomed. These commissions,
usually composed of members chosen for their non-partisan character as

48. 12 N. Y. S. Constitutional Convention Committee, Reports (1938).
49.
(1967).

16 N. Y. S. Temporary State Commission on the Constitutional Convention, Reports
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well as their experience in state constitutional issues, can assist delegates
in acclimatizing themselves to the issues.
Preparatory Commissions are not without their disadvantages. Since
governor
generally plays the dominant if not exclusive role in their
the
composition, they can be contaminated by the partisanship they are
meant to avoid. Convention delegates can, and have, ignored the work
of such commissions, leading critics to charge that they add unnecessarily
to an already expensive convention process.
Whereas preparatory commissions play a supporting role in the
process of constitutional reform, study commissions are primarily
responsible for producing substantive document changes. As with
preparatory bodies, their responsibilities vary, and can be categorized as
narrow or broad. A commission with narrow authority is charged only
to study the constitution, submit factual reports concerning the need for
revision, and occasionally recommend changes in the document. The
1965 Illinois Constitutional Study Commission is an example. It was
appointed to determine if revision was necessary and whether it should
be accomplished by convention or amendment. The commission
recommended a convention, and one was called in 1969. The Alaska
Constitutional Revision Task Force is another example of a narrowly
authorized body. It was mandated to study alternatives to the current
methods of constitutional revision. The California Revision Commissions, established in 1993, were authorized to study and make recommendations on selected topics ranging from the budget process to community
resources and delivery systems.
Three-fourths of the Commissions operating in the last thirty years
have been granted broad authorizations including proposing entirely new
documents. The Texas Constitutional Revision Commission of 1968
submitted a new constitution to the legislature but no action was taken.
A similar fate befell the revised constitution submitted in 1979 by the
Alabama commission. A new constitution recommended by the Idaho
Commission on Constitutional Reform was accepted by the legislature
but rejected by the voters.
Other commissions have been more successful. From 1963 to 1973
The California Constitutional Revision Commission achieved complete
constitutional revision in three phases. The Ohio Constitutional Revision
Commission fostered systematic revision of the Ohio constitution through
a series of twelve reports issued between 1969 and 1977. The Utah
Constitutional Revision Study Commission, created in 1969, is the only
statutorily permanent commission achieving considerable success. The
commission has made recommendations on, and voters have approved
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amendments concerning seven articles. In the 1930's, although Georgia
was in critical need of constitutional revision, reform by convention was
at best a remote possibility. The existing constitution required a twothirds vote in each house of the General Assembly to call a convention.
Representation at such a convention would be based on population.
Georgia's malapportioned assembly, fearing a reapportionment, blocked
all attempts to convene a convention.50 It was, however, willing to
create a constitutional commission, knowing that all its recommendations
required legislative approval. The commission shrewdly ignored the
apportionment issue and recommended a new constitution subsequently
accepted by the legislature and approved by the voters in 1945.
The Florida Constitution Revision Commission (CRC) is permitted
to submit recommendations directly to the voters regarding all aspects of
the constitution with the exception of the tax and budget provisions. In
1978 the CRC became the first commission to submit amendments
directly to the electorate. However, its recommendations were rejected
by the voters. The commission was later vindicated when most of its
proposals were adopted through legislatively approved amendments. In
1980 Florida voters rejected a proposal abolishing the CRC, indicating
continued support for the commission.
The Florida Taxation and Budget Reform Commission may submit
tax and budgetary referendums to the people directly. It also may submit
statutory recommendations on similar matters to the legislature. In 1992,
Florida voters made constitutional history by becoming the first state to
approve amendments submitted by a commission without legislative
action.
Commissions have proved to be effective substitutes for constitutional conventions when voters refuse to approve their convening.
Between 1891 and 1963, the voters of Pennsylvania, fearing the
institution of a graduated income tax, rejected six attempts to convene
In 1963 Governor William Scranton
constitutional conventions. 5
on Constitutional Revision. The
Commission
a
Governor's
appointed
commission submitted a report containing recommendations and
resolutions to the legislature in January 1964. In 1967 voters approved
a call for a limited convention to revise four articles. Eight amendments
proposed by the commission were adopted at that convention.

50.

LEAH CHANIN, REFERENCE GUIDE TO GEORGIA LEGAL HISTORY AND LEGAL RESEARCH,

13, (1980).
51. Gustave G. Amsterdam, A Constitutional Convention is not the Answer at the Prevent
Time, PA. Bar Assn. Qtly., 37, 377-378, (June, 1966).

19961

CHANGING STATE CONSTITUTIONS

The commission offers a tempting alternative to the constitutional
convention: talented, experienced citizens deliberating on a single task,
in a group small enough for ordered, intimate discussion, but large
enough to entertain a representative range of alternatives. Since the work
must be approved by the legislature and ratified by the people, little if
any popular control is lost. Additionally, commissions are less costly.
The 1967 New York Commission, expensive at $800,000, paled in
comparison to the $6.4 million spent by the 1967 convention.
Despite these advantages, study commissions have their weaknesses.
The method of selection can led to "political hand-picking and coloration".52 More significant, as Albert Sturm as noted, commissions are
preferred by state legislatures because they maintain control over
proposals emanating from such bodies.5 3 With the single exception of
the Florida commissions, the great weakness of commissions is their
complete dependence on the legislative branch for success. When the
legislature is the obstacle course, commissions face two risks: independent recommendations which are rejected or ignored; or recommendations shaped to fit the anticipated demands of the the legislature. The
latter danger is illustrated by the remarks of a member of the Vermont
Constitutional Commission concerning the commission's final report to
the legislature:
...mere fiddling with the past during a time
which demands our creating a political framework necessary for our survival as a people.
The goal has been subverted by the majority's
attempt to shape its report in terms that it54
felt the General Assembly would accept.
The only weapons such commissions wield are the prestige of their
membership and the quality of their recommendations, Weapons which
in certain instances have proved to be effective levers in forcing action
from recalcitrant legislatures.
Commissions bring important and necessary contributions to the
process of constitutional reform, and they are likely to play an

52. Sturm, supra note 25, at 93.
53. Albert Sturm, The Development ofAmerican State Constitutions,Publius: The Journalof
Federalism, 12, 84-85, (winter, 1982).
54. As quoted in Albert Sturm, State Constitutional Modernization by Commission: 19661972, National Civic Review 62, 357, (July, 1973).

HOFSTRA LAW & POLICY SYMPOSIUM

[Vol. 1:27

increasingly important role in the process of constitutional reform in the
states.
IV. POPULAR INITIATIVE

Eighteen states permit the proposing of amendments by popular
initiative.5 5 A percentage of voters, as designated by the constitution,
are allowed to petition amendments which they deem desireable1 6 In
Mississippi, regardless of legislative preference, the proposition will
appear on the ballot. However, if the legislature amends the proposal,
both the original and the amended version appear on the ballot. If the
legislature proposes an alternative, both will appear on the ballot. In no
state can the initiative be used to propose a new constitution or make
extensive revisions in the existing one.
Although the constitutional initiative is as old as the nation, its
greatest popularity was during the Progressive Era. It was part of a
package of reforms designed to increase popular participation and the
role of citizens in government policy making.Y By the last quarter of
the twentieth century, however, the procedure came to be identified as a
means for well financed organizations and/or groups to obtain favorable
laws and as a mechanism allowing a tyrannous majority, inflamed by
prejudice or temporary hysteria, to deprive minorities of basic rights.58
With renewed interest in the initiative and referendum in the last twenty
five years, a lively debate has emerged among politicians and scholars

55. They are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota.
56. In Massachusetts, the initiative must gain the support of at least 25% of the General Court
(the legislative body) to appear on the ballot. In Mississippi, whatever the legislature does, the
initiative will appear on the ballot.
57. JOHN D. HICKS, THE POPULIST REVOLT, 406-407, (1961); GEORGE MOWRY, THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA 1900-1920; THE REFORM PERSUASION, (Washington D.C.: American Historical
Association, Pamphlet nos. 212, 1958).
58. These dangers were recognized while the movement was at its peak by HERBERT CROLY,
PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY, 307, (1914). The initiative continues to find little favor among academic
commentators. See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, The Initiative and Referendum in New Jersey: Bygone
Pursuit or Newfound Questfor PopularSupremacy, State Constitutional Commentaries and Notes
2 (winter, 1991), p. 15; Dave Kehr, I & R and Minority Rights, State Government 93-94,33, (1993);
A Tool For Democracy? National Civic Review, 353, 6 Sept., (1978).
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over the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure. 9

The constitutional initiative has been the least used, least successful,
and most controversial means of constitutional reform among the states.

As of 1986 it accounted for only 19 percent of all the amendments
proposed and 11 percent of those adopted.60

Between 1986 and 1993 initiatives constituted only 10 percent of all
amendments adopted. 1
TABLE III

LEGISLATIVE AND POPULAR INITIATIVES
1906-1986
Frequency

All methods
Initiative

1,959
628

Involving States
Bills of rights

57*

Success

25

'Janice May arrived at this figure under a broad definition of rights, one which
includes rights concerning women and minorities. If a narrow definition is used,
i.e., rights traditionally found in bills of rights, that number drops to 23. Figures
computed from data presented by Janice May, "The Constitutional Initiative
Initiative: A Threat to Rights?" in Stanley Friedelbaum, ed., Human Rights in the
States (Westport; Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1988), 163-168; Janice May,
"Amending State Bills of Rights: Do Voters Reduce Rights?" STATE GOVERNMENT 1992-93 (,ashington, D.C.: CQ Inc. 1992).

Table I shows clearly that, with regards to rights, the initiative has
been used sparingly. Resort to the constitutional initiative has increased
in recent years, and the success rate has also risen slightly. The success
rate in the biennium 1992-1993 for rights-related initiatives was 13%.

59. Two works which focus on the pros and cons of this resurgent populism are: DAVID
MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION VOTING ON BALLOTS INTHE UNITED STATES, (1984); and JOSEPH
F. ZIMMERMAN, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY POPULISM REVISITED, (1986).

60. Janice May, The ConstitutionalInitiative:A Threat to Rights? in STANLEY FRIEDELBAUM
ED. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES, 166-167, (1988).

61. Figures computed from data provided in the Book of the States from the years 1986-1993.
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Does the constitutional initiative constitute a threat to civil liberties
62
and constitutional values as well as create constitutional confusion?
In a series of articles, Janice May has addressed this question in
systematic, empirical fashion. 63 Her findings are instructive. For the
1900-1986 period, twenty-five rights-related initiatives were adopted.
Ten promoted womens' rights (nine granted the suffrage and one

involved jury service); three extended criminal rights by abolishing the
death penalty and requiring a grand jury indictment and speedy trial.
Two removed the poll tax, and one extended property rights to aliens, for
a total of 16 rights-extending decisions.'
With regard to rightsrestricting amendments, May concluded: "There is considerable evidence
that, although not numerous, more of the electorally successful constitutional initiatives have reduced rather than expanded rights".65

These include, inter alia, repeal of fair housing, anti-busing, antidesegregation, restoration of the death penalty, propositions limiting the

rights of the accused,

mandatory referendum on fair housing, and

making English the official language of the states. Contrariwise, voters
rejected a variety of rights-restricting measures, including denying rights
to "subversives"; state aid to private schools; two anti-abortion measures;

repeal of ERA measures; and measures regarding freedom of religion or
expression.
The data gathered from the five year period, 1986 through 1990,
also provide further support for the conclusion that the constitutional
initiative has become the most rights restrictive mode of constitutional

reform. Of the amendments adopted by all methods, 20 were restrictive
and 19 rights expanding. Of the I1 constitutional initiatives adopted,
72% percent (8), were rights restrictive, contributing disproportionately

62. The general impression created by commentators is one of rights reduction. See, e.g.,
Donald Wilkes, First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills ofRightls, Miss. L. J. 54 (1984),
223; William E. Adams Jr., Pre-ElectionAnti-Gay Ballot InitiativeChallenges: Issues of Electoral
Fairness,MajoritarianTyranny and Direct Democracy, OHO ST. L. J.55 (1994), p. 628.
63. May, supra note 60; Amending State Bills of Rights: Do Voters Reduce Rights, State
Government 1992-93 (Washington, D.C.: CQ Inc., 1992).
64. May had understandable difficulty in classifying some of the measures. For example the
eleven "right to work" amendments can be viewed as "union busting" or giving individuals the right
of choice and association; tort reforms and other miscellaneous provisions were treated as neither
rights expanding nor rights reducing. The handful of states which added a right to bear arms present
the most interesting case. Surely they are, on the face of it, rights expanding; on the other hand
liberals have never thought much of a right to bear arms and by and large would not see these
initiatives as rights expanding. Thus does ideology intrude on the question of what counts as right
expanding and what as rights restricting. May, supra note 31, at 168-69.
65. Id. at 169.
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to rights reducing amendments.66
The largest number of amendments, nearly half, concern crime.
James M. Fischer has argued that except for criminal justice and certain
racial questions, voters either support or leave other civil rights alone.67
This conclusion is supported by May:
the question of whether voters can be trusted to protect rights is
misguided. The desire to narrow the rights of the accused is pervasive,
reaching into the Congress, the White House and the U.S. Supreme
Court. In other words voters thus far have not been out of step with
many political leaders and judges.. .6
...

Although the record of the constitutional initiative is more positive
than earlier research has suggested, it is a fair conclusion that among the
modes of constitutional reform the constitutional initiative is the most
susceptible to misuse and demagogy. There are, however, a variety of
constraints on this procedure which have reduced the danger.
All propositions, initiative or otherwise, must conform to the
national constitution. On a number of occasions the Supreme Court has
invalidated state amendments as violations of the national constitution.
Reitman v. Mulkey69 is illustrative. A constitutional initiative repealing
California's fair housing law and privatizing decisions on the sale, rental
or purchase of real estate was held in violation of the equal protection
clause of the 14th Amendment.7"
Federal courts protect the national constitution; state courts have the
dual responsibility to uphold both national and state constitutions. In
Strumpfv. Lau and In Re InitiativePetitionNo. 349, state high courts in
Nevada and Colorado invalidated measures imposing term limits on
members of the Congress. 7' State courts have also been willing to
strike down amendments which do not meet state constitutional
requirements. In the most prominent case, Raven v. Deukmejian,72 the
California Supreme Court held an initiative to be a "revision" of the

66. May, supra note 31, at 32.
67. Ballot Proposition: The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State Constitutional
Jurisprudence,Hastings Const. L. Q., 11, 44, (Fall, 1983).
68. May, supra note 31, at 32.

69. 387 U.S. 386 (1967).
70. Two other decisions invalidating initiatives were Guinn v. U.S., 238 U.S. 347 (1915),
(voiding grandfather clause protecting while votes from illiteracy test); Lucas v. Colorado General
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (voiding initiative allowing representation on non-population basis).
71. 839 P.2d 129 (Nev. 1992); 838 P. 2d 1 (Okla. 1992).
72. 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
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constitution rather than an amendment, and as such, in violation of
Article 18 of the state constitution, requiring revisions of the constitution
to be initiated by convention or legislature prior to submission to the
voters.
Other challenges arise when it is asserted that the ballot proposition
does not fall within the proper subject matter for direct legislation. In
1984, the Montana Supreme Court removed from the ballot a proposition
compelling the state legislature to petition Congress to call a constitutional convention to pass a balanced budget amendment on the grounds that
it was not an amendment to the Constitution.73
Another limitation on constitutional initiative in a number of state
documents is the single subject rule, requiring that the material contained
in the proposition be reasonably germane, and functionally related to a
single subject. The Florida courts have been particularly stringent in
enforcing this provision as well as other procedural requirements. In Re
Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General-RestrictsLaws Related to
74 , the Florida Supreme Court found numerous flaws in
Discrimination
a proposition aimed at preventing the state from adopting laws protecting
groups from discrimination. The measure was struck down on, inter
75
alia, equal protection grounds as violative of the single-subject rule.
State courts are generally willing to permit pre-election review of
challenges based on procedural limitations such as failure to meet the
minimum number of qualified signatures, timeliness of filing, the form
of the petition, its title and the summary 76 Even when state courts
sustain an initiative, they retain the responsibility for interpreting these
amendments. In People v. Anderson77 the California Supreme Court
struck down the death penalty on state constitutional grounds. In 1982
California voters approved a constitutional initiative overruling Anderson
and restoring the death penalty. In People v. Superior Court of Santa
Clara County, the California Supreme Court voided (on due process
grounds for vagueness) an initiative which applied the death penalty in
aggravating circumstances. 7 Finally, the electoral process serves as a

73. State ex rel Harperv. Waltermire, 691 P.2d 836 (Mont. 1984).
74. 632 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1994).

75. Id., at 1020-21. See also, In Re PetitionNo.344, 797 P.2d 326 (Okla. 1990); Legislature
of Californiav. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991); and Robert W. Lee, Pre-ElectionInitiative Review
in Florida:A Frameworkfor Analysis, FLA. B. J., 69 (March, 1995), 14.
76. James D. Gordon III and David B. Magelby, Pre-ElectionJudicialReview ofInitiatives
and Referendums, NOTRE DAME L. REv. 64 (1989), pp. 302-304.
77. 493 P.2d 880 (Cal.), cert. den. 409 U.S. 958 (1972).
78. 647 P.2d 796 (Cal. 1982).
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check on the constitutional initiative. As noted earlier, voters have
rejected a fair number of rights-restrictive propositions.
Though there are a variety of checks operating to reduce the
likelihood that rash or dangerous proposals will be adopted, the record
indicates that, of the four modes of constitutional change, the constitutional initiative is the most susceptible to abuse.
In response to these abuses, some states have limited the constitutional initiative so that amendments proposed by popular initiative do not
alter fundamental provisions of the constitution. Mississippi places the
Bill of Rights off limits to amendment by initiative, and Massachusetts
excepts its Declaration of Rights, the judiciary and matters relating to
religion or religious institutions. Illinois permits the initiative only with
regard to the legislative article. Missouri's constitution stipulates that
the initiative "shall not be used. . . for any other purpose prohibited by
the Constitution"." 9 It is not coincidental that none of the dubious
initiatives have arisen in these states.
States also attempt to limit frivolous use of the initiative by
requiring a minimum number of signatures for placement on the ballot.
Arizona mandates 15% of the total votes cast for all gubernatorial
candidates in the last election; Oklahoma stipulates 15% of the votes cast
for the office receiving the greatest number of votes.8 0 In addition, half
the states providing for the initiative require a geographic distribution of
signatures. The requirement is meant to insure that only issues of
statewide importance are placed on the ballot. Typical in this respect is
Florida, whose requirement of 8% of the total vote cast in the last
presidential election, must be obtained in 50% of the congressional
districts. For ratification, Illinois requires either a majority of those
voting in the election or three-fifths of those voting on the amendment.
Mississippi mandates a majority vote on the amendment, which must be
at least 40% of the total vote cast in the election. Initiatives in Nevada
require a majority vote in two successive general elections.
If there is a place for a constitutional initiative, limits such as those
found in Mississippi, Massachusetts, and Nevada offer a middle ground
between those who wish to see the procedure abolished, and those who
wish it to be as accessible and majoritarian as possible.

79. Art. III, See. 51. The section does not distinguish between statutory and constitutional

initiatives.
80. The smallest percentage, Massachusetts, is 3% of the total votes cast for governor at the
preceding biennial election, but not less than 25,000.
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CONCLUSION

Comparing state and national amending processes reveals a number
of striking differences. At the state level the formal amending procedures are majoritarian and participatory, used more frequently and are
more numerous and varied. These characteristics have contributed to the
shape of state charters - lengthy, detailed, policy-oriented and a bit on the
chaotic side. What is more noteworthy is that these participatory and
majoritarian processes have produced over 5,800 amendments, 150 new
constitutions, and have done so, by and large, within the boundaries of
the national political consensus. Radical or dangerous amendments have
been the exception; and some of those did not survive a screening
process consisting of the procedural requirements in the constitutions, the
electorate, and the national and state judiciaries.
Given a political landscape punctuated with the inflammatory
appeals of politicians, populated with stridently ideological one-issue
groups, and suffused with a frustrated and angry electorate - conditions
not new or unique to contemporary America - the wonder is that these
majoritarian and participatory amending processes have not been vehicles
for wholesale, radical change in the fundamental law of the states.
As an "incomplete",document, the survival of the Constitution of
the United States, is predicated on the continued existence and vitality of
state constitutions.'
The national Constitution is silent on such
fundamental matters as local government and finance, education and state
government, to name a few. Along with the standard contents of a
constitution (Bill of Rights, suffrage, distribution of powers), state
constitutions must contain provisions germane to these other areas of
responsibility. In addition, state documents must be flexible, able to
accommodate changing economic and social conditions, as well as new
areas of responsibility. Home rule, strengthened executive management,
and social welfare are all 20th century additions to state constitutions.
The difficulty of amendment at the national level, coupled with the
political and constitutional limits on national power, have placed the
continued vitality of the American constitutional system on the states'
ability to respond to the demands of the 21st century. The willingness
of states to amend and revise their fundamental documents augurs well
for that vitality.

81. Donald S. Lutz, The Purposesof American State Constitutions. Publius: The Journalof
Federalism, 12, 27-44, (Winter, 1982).

